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Introduction
1 In 1696, Pierre Bayle would write in his Dictionnaire entry dedicated to the late English
philosopher,  Thomas Hobbes:  ‘‘De toutes les vertus morales  il  n’y avoit guère que la
Religion qui fût une matière problématique dans la pensée de Hobbes.”1 Even today, the
theological  thought  of  Hobbes  is  still  at  the  core  of  a  broad  and  in-depth  debate.2
Countless  studies  have  been devoted to  theological  and theologico-political  works  of
Hobbes,  but  often  these  texts  have  been  analysed  separately  from  scientific  or
philosophical-scientific  works. On  the  contrary,  to  correctly  understand  Hobbes’s
theological thought, it is fundamental that we shine a light on the principles of his so-
called “first philosophy.” In this article I will focus on Hobbes’s philosophical notion of
God, without directly addressing the problem of the role that God plays in his political
philosophy.3
2 This study will note to evaluate the truthfulness of Hobbes’ religious faith. Rather, it has
the much more modest goal of grasping and underlining the contrast between Hobbes’
philosophical principles and the theological position he supports in many of his writings.
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3 A brief glance at the book The Hunting of Leviathan, by Samuel I. Mintz, offers an idea of
the breadth of criticism against Hobbes during his lifetime: more than eighty works had
been published against him between 1650 and 1700.4 Not even the death of the much-
hated “monster of Malmesbury,” which occurred on December 4,  1679,5 appeased the
storm of  attacks.  Hobbes  was  opposed  for  his  mathematical,  scientific,  and  political
doctrines,  but  the  most  violent  attacks  addressed  his  religious  ideas.  The  wave  of
criticism concentrated against his writings during the Restoration.  According to John
Aubrey,  an English bishop even proposed to Parliament to condemn to the stake the
“good old gentleman.”6 We cannot ascertain the real consistency of these threats, but it
seems that  Hobbes  feared strongly  for  his  life,  enough to  actually  burn some of  his
manuscripts, to prevent them from ending into the wrong hands.7
4 In  the  17th  century,  the  name  of  Hobbes  was  already  surrounded  by  an  aura  of
irreligiosity.  In a letter dated November 30,  1680,  and addressed to Thomas Tenison,
bishop of Canterbury, John Wallis — the mathematician and member of the Royal Society
who had engaged in a long and deleterious scientific altercation with Hobbes — accused
the philosopher of atheism.8 Some years before, the royalist Edward Nicholas, in a letter
to Edward Hyde, described Hobbes as the “great Atheist,” or the “father of atheists.”9 This
idea is often reiterated, with slight and negligible differences, by many of Hobbes’ critics.
Hyde himself, in his work A Brief View and Survey of the Dangerous and Pernicious Errors
to Church and State,  in Mr. Hobbes Book, entitled Leviathan (1676),  while presenting
Hobbes as a man of integrity,10 writes that the opinions expressed in Leviathan subverted
the principles of the Christian religion, and observes that, confronted with this text, a
shrewd reader could easily assume that its author had no religion at all.11 An analogous
opinion  shines  from  William  Lucy’s  Observations,  Censures  and  Confutations  and
Notorious Errors in Mr. Hobbes his Leviathan (1663),  from The Catching of Leviathan
(1658) by John Bramhall, and from The Creed of Mr. Hobbes Examined ( 1670), by Thomas
Tenison.
5 In spite of all these accusations, Hobbes always professed himself to be faithful to the
“Church of England,”12 and his biographer, Richard Blackbourne, seems to confirm what
he maintained. 13
6 In fact, a significant amount of “anti-Hobbesian” literature includes works that are often
limited to the invective. However, some texts are instead interesting, and it is important
to check whether some of these criticisms are really based on Hobbes’ works. Among
these  critical  texts,  Bramhall’s  The  Catching  of  Leviathan  is  particularly  interesting.
Bramhall  was  the  Arminian  bishop  of  Derry,14 who  engaged  Thomas  Hobbes  in  a
controversy over issues concerning freedom, necessity, and chance. 15 Bramhall affirms
that  Hobbes’  theological  position is  actually  conceptually  unsustainable and that  the
philosopher is nothing more than a hidden atheist16.  Gathering some of Hobbes’ more
significant reflections on religion, Bramhall offers this summary of Hobbes’ theological
thought:
His principles are brim full of prodigious impiety. In these four things, opinions of
ghosts, ignorance of second causes, devotion to what men fear, and taking of things
casual  for  prognostics,  consisteth  the  natural  seed  of  religion; the  culture  and
improvement whereof, he referreth only to policy. Human and divine politics, are
but  politics.  And  again, mankind  hath  this  from  the  conscience  of  their  own
weakness, and the admiration of natural events, that the most part of men believe
that there is an invisible God, the maker of all visible things. And a little after he
telleth us, thatsuperstition proceedeth from fear without right reason, and atheism
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from an opinion of  reason without  fear; making atheism to be more reasonable
than superstition. What is now become of that divine worship which natural reason
did  assign  unto  God,  the  honour  of  existence,  infiniteness,  incomprehensibility,
unity,  ubiquity?  (…)  He  proceedeth  further,  that atheism itself,  though it  be  an
erroneous opinion, and therefore a sin, yet it ought to be numbered among the sins
of imprudence or ignorance. He addeth, that an atheist is punished not as a subject
is punished by his king, because he did not observe laws: but as an enemy, by an
enemy, because he would not accept laws. His reason is, because the atheist never
submitted  his  will  to  the  will  of  God,  whom  he  never  thought  to  be. And  he
concludeth that man's obligation to obey God proceedeth from his weakness, (De
Cive, xv. 7: vol. II. p. 336): Manifestum est obligationem ad prestandam ipsi (Deo)
obedientiam,  incumbere  hominibus  propter  imbecilitatem.  (…).  First,  it  is
impossible that should be a sin of mere ignorance or imprudence, which is directly
contrary  to  the  light  of  natural  reason.  The  laws  of  nature  need  no  new
promulgation, being imprinted naturally by God in the heart of man. The law of
nature was written in our hearts by the finger of God, without our assent; or rather,
 the law of nature is the assent itself. Then if nature dictate to us that there is a God,
and that this God is to be worshipped in such and such a manner, it is not possible
that atheism should be a sin of mere ignorance.17
7 In this passage, Bramhall focuses on some fundamental issues of Hobbes’ theological and
religious thought, which should be examined in detail.
 
Real causes, and “imagined” ones
8 Early in his text, Bramhall quotes a passage from Chapter 12 of Leviathan, where Hobbes
sums  up  four  anthropological  causes  of  religion.  The  so-called  “Naturall  seeds  of
Religion” are: a) “Opinion of Ghosts” 18;  b) “Ignorance of second causes”;  c) “Devotion
towards what men fear”; and, finally, d) “Taking of things Casuall for Prognostiques”19.
The English philosopher, avoid facing accusation of reducing religion to a mere product
of  human fantasies  and  aspirations,  in  his  Answer,  tends  to  distinguish  between the
genesis of pagan cults and the origin of belief in one God, proper to the monotheistic
religions20. Likewise, in Leviathan, Hobbes links the rise of the pagan gods to the fear of
invisible powers. However,
[…] the acknowledging of one God Eternall,  Infinite,  and Omnipotent,  may more
easily be derived, from the desire men have to know the causes of naturall bodies,
and their several vertues, and operations; than from the feare of what was to befall
them in time to come. For he that from any effect hee seeth come to passe, should
reason to the next and immediate cause thereof, and from thence to the cause of
that cause, and plunge himselfe profoundly in the pursuit of causes; shall at last
come to this, that there must be (as even the Heathen Philosophers confessed) one
First Mover; that is, a First, and an Eternall cause of all things; which is that which
men mean by the name of God: And all this without thought of their fortune; the
solicitude whereof, both enclines to fear, and hinders them from the search of the
causes of other things; and thereby gives occasion of feigning of as many Gods, as
there be men that feigne them.21
9 Hobbes seems to establish a caesura between paganism and monotheism: while the first is
based on fear and ignorance, the latter shows a certain convergence with an inquiry
conducted through a philosophical and speculative method. Tracing back the causal chain
that links each effect to its cause, the philosopher would inevitably reach a first principle:
the  first  mover,  or,  causa  prima.  This  idea  seems  to  lead  to  an  agreement  between
philosophy and monotheism, because the notion of a unique God would be conceivable as
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a sort of natural fulfillment of philosophical inquiry. In fact, in The Elements of Law (1640),
Hobbes had already stated that the analysis of the causal chain inevitably leads to the
idea of a causa prima, or, first mover.22 
10 However, if we turn to De Motu, Loco et Tempore, or Anti-White (~ 1643), we will see that
Hobbes’ position is remarkably different. Thomas White, in his De Mundo Dialogi, defended
the possibility of arguing indubitably the existence of God.23 On the contrary, according to
Hobbes,  this attempt must be considered “afiloso@fon,” that is,  non-philosophical,  or
contrary to philosophy, because “to prove that something exists, there is need of the
senses, or  experience.” 24 Moreover,  Hobbes  openly  claims  that  venturing  into
philosophical, and rational, demonstrations of the existence of God, as did his adversary,
is contrary to both theology and religion: 
When a demonstration persuades us of  the truth of  any proposition,  that is  no
longer faith,  but is natural knowledge.  (…) Therefore as soon as any proposition is
demonstrated it is no longer an article of faith but is a theorem in philosophy. The
inescapable  consequence is  that,  in  matters  determined by the authority  of  the
Church, as philosophy is acquired, so the same degree is faith eroded. Articles of
faith are, however, the limbs of religion; therefore, when the articles of faith desert
religion for philosophy, religion cannot but be gradually weakened.25
11 Here, the agreement between philosophy and monotheism, present in the Elements and in
Leviathan  seems  actually  to  collapse.  On the  contrary,  religion  is  here  rather  rigidly
opposed to philosophy, and a sort of incongruity in the development of Hobbes’ thought
emerges. If in the Elements, as well as in Leviathan, Hobbes maintains an idea of God as
causa  prima,  in  De  Motu,  Loco  et  Tempore (which  chronologically  places  between  the
Elements and  Leviathan),  he  conversely  maintains  an  opposite  idea  regarding  the
demonstration of the existence of God. Is it possible that in De Motu Hobbes abandoned
the position held in the Elements, and finally returned to his steps eight years later?
12 To clarify this question it is useful to examine the matter in detail.26 In Leviathan, Hobbes
states that “For it is with the mysteries of our Religion, as with wholsome pills for the
sick, which swallowed whole, have the vertue to cure, but chewed, are for the most part
cast up again without effect.”27 Even more explicit is De Cive (1642), where, using the same
image, Hobbes clarifies the difference between faith and knowledge: 
[…] the latter proceeds by cutting a proposition into small pieces, then chews it
over  and  digests  it  slowly;  the  former  swallows  it  whole.  It  contributes  to
knowledge to explain the words in which the subject of inquiry is put forward; in
fact,  this  is  the  one and only  way to  knowledge,  the  way  of  definitions.  But  it  is
harmful to  faith.  For  things  put  forward  for  belief  which  are  beyond  human
understanding never become clearer by explanation, but to the contrary, become
more obscure and more difficult to believe. A man who goes about to demonstrate
the mysteries of Faith by natural reason, is like a sick man who tries to chew some
health-giving but bitter pills before swallowing them; the result is that he throws
them up straight away, whereas, if he had swallowed them whole, they would have
made him better.28
13 Even  in  Historia  Ecclesiastica (presumably  composed  in  the  1660s,  and  published
posthumously in 1688), Hobbes reiterates that the articles of revealed religion should not
be examined through philosophical analysis. Addressing to the faithful, he warns him to
not philosophize about the mysteries of faith: “Don’t just taste the remedy to sin with the
roof of your mouth. If you / want to be cured, open wide and swallow it like a brave
fellow. / For the man who chews the sacred mysteries with a logical tooth, is / seized by
dizziness, nausea and vomiting.”29. Here too, Hobbes maintains a position which is similar
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to that already present in De Motu, and in De Cive, where the philosopher openly claims
that  the  speculative  inquiry  to  what  exceed  human  understanding  turns  out  to  be
harmful to the faith. This statement is not per se disconcerting, and is typical of some
skeptical and fideistic positions. Nevertheless, if reason tried to explain something that
exceeds its own abilities, surpassing its limits, its effort should be unproductive and vain
for reason itself, rather than for the faith. To clarify this issue it may be useful to use
terms and concepts, typical of Locke’s lexicon.30 If the mysteries of the faith fell into the
field of what we define above reason, the application of a philosophical method to these
mysteries should be an activity as heavy as unproductive for reason itself, and not for
faith.31 On the contrary, the rational inquiry would be detrimental to faith, only if the
matter of its mysteries were contrary to reason.
14 There is no doubt that Hobbes considered most of the Catholic dogmas unreasonable: in
Leviathan, for example, he does not spare his criticism to what he considers the numerous
absurdities of the Roman creed.32 Moreover, Hobbes tries to reduce the articles of faith to
those considered fundamental. This is evident in the Elements, but also in Leviathan (where
all the articles are reduced to an unum necessarium33), in the Appendix to the Latin edition
of this work (1668)34 as well as in the Historical Narration Concerning Heresy,35 published
posthumously in 1680. 
15 However, if we return to the quoted passage of De Motu, we see that Hobbes does not
define “afiloso@fon” the attempt to rationally explain some articles of revealed religion,
but this definition is referred to the same proof of God’s existence. 
16 Finally, the panorama surfaced by the comparison of the almost contemporary texts of De 
motu and De  Cive thus  manifests  an  opposition,  rather  than a  convergence,  between
philosophy  and  religion,  between  rational  knowledge  and  faith.  We  must  consider,
however, whether these positions are reflected in other Hobbes’ texts. In An Answer to the
Catching  of  Leviathan,  Hobbes  affirms  that  “Ignorance  of  second  causes,”  and  not
philosophical inquiry, “made men fly to some first cause, the fear of which bred devotion
and worship.”36 If we go back to the chapter 12 of Leviathan, Hobbes proposes a curious
amalgam of anthropological, psychological, and rational elements, which oriented men
towards the religious phenomenon. First, he claims that “it is peculiar to the nature of
Man, to be inquisive into the Causes of the Events they see, some more, some lesse; but all
men so much, as to be curious in the search of the causes of their own good and evill
fortune.”37 Secondly, he adds that “upon the sight of any thing that hath a Beginning, to
think also it had a cause, which determined the same to begin, then when it did, rather
than sooner or later.”38 Finally, he observes that:
[…] whereas there is no other Felicity of Beasts, but the enjoying of their quotidian
Food, Ease, and Lusts; as having little or no foresight of the time to come, for want
of  observation,  and memory of  the  order,  consequence,  and dependence  of  the
things they see; Man observeth how one Event hath been produced by another; and
remembereth in them Antecedence and Consequence; And when he cannot assure
himselfe of the true causes of things, (for the causes of good and evill fortune for
the most part are invisible,) he supposes causes of them, either such as his own
fancy suggesteth; or trusteth to the Authority of other men, such as he thinks to be
his friends, and wiser than himselfe.39
17 The  terminology  adopted  is  important,  and  it  is  opportune  to  dwell  on  this.  The
supposition,  or  conjecture,  is  a  fundamental  element  of  Hobbes’  philosophical  and
scientific thought, and he explicitly recommends to use a hypothetical method in natural
philosophy.40 However, here the supposition is not founded on a rational conjecture, but
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is  instead  based  on  imagination  and  authority.41 Not  by  chance,  Hobbes  actually
underlines, from a linguistic point of view, the fantastic nature of these images, using the
term fancy.  This is confirmed by a passage from the previous chapter,  where Hobbes
states that “Want of Science, that is Ignorance of causes disposeth, or rather constraineth
a man to rely on the advise, and authority of others.”42 Quoting from the De Cive, Bramhall
accuses Hobbes of bringing back even faith in one God to the fear of natural phenomena,
and to the awareness of man’s weakness in front of them. Hobbes, in his Answer, has no
difficulty in admitting that even faith in the only true God originated from the passion of
fear, and particularly from the fear of the power of God,43 and in De Homine (1658), he
actually maintains the same idea.44 However, Bramhall and Hobbes completely differ on
the interpretation of this affirmation. If Hobbes declares that he attested within the limits
of a pious timor Dei, on the contrary, the English bishop assimilates it to a fear generated
by the ignorance of the real causes of phenomena. In fact, Bramhall could very easily
maintain his interpretation, because it is based on several passages of Hobbes’ works, like
this one, taken from chapter 16 of De Cive, where Hobbes argued that “Aware of their own
weakness and in wonder at natural events,  the human race has developed an almost
universal belief that an invisible God is the Workman who has made all visible things.”45. 
This passage, as well as many other places mentioned, leads us to a reflection: as Karl
Schuhmann observes,46 when Hobbes refers to the idea of God conceived as the summit of
the philosophical inquiry that investigates the causal chain, he never operates a complete
identification of the causa prima with God, but rather he identifies it with what men call
God, or what men believe to be God. By doing so, Hobbes underlines a psychological need
on the part of the human being to make the idea of God coincide with that of a causa prima
, or first mover. 
18 Let us momentarily leave aside the philosophical concept of God, and consider religion
only,  in order to acknowledge the legitimacy of  the remarks by William Lucy,  in his
Observations, Censures, and Confutations and Notorious Errors in Mr. Hobbes his Leviathan. In
this work, Lucy argues that the four causes of religion, mentioned by Hobbes in Chapter
12 of Leviathan, constituted the natural seeds of the true religion, as well as of the false
ones, that is, the pagan cults.47 In the same works, indeed, Hobbes offers a definition of
religion that is rooted in ancient literature (in particular in Statius’s Thebaid,48 and, above
all,  in  Lucretius’s  De  rerum natura49),  and  which  eliminates  the  differences  between
religion  and  superstition,  by  bringing  back  them  to  the  same,  anthropological,  and
psychological origin: the fear of invisible powers. “Feare of power invisible, feigned by the
mind, or imagined from tales publiquely allowed, RELIGION, not allowed, SUPERSTITION. And
when the power imagined, is truly such as we imagine, TRUE RELIGION.”50 If we exclude the
official admission by the civil authority, there is evidently no difference between religion
and superstition.51
19 The application of philosophical inquiry to religion thus produces problematic outcomes.
Hobbes sometimes seems to establish a gap,  or even an opposition,  between the two
separated domains of philosophy and religion: where the first is the search for natural
causes,  conducted with method,  the latter is  rooted in the ignorance of  the “second
causes”.
20 This problematic approach to religion leads us to delve deeper into Hobbes’ theological
thought, by carefully examining his idea of God, and the attributes of the deity that are
accessible  to  human  mind.  As  it  is  known,  in  De  Cive and  in  Leviathan,  Hobbes
peremptorily affirms the unknowability of God, and this idea is reaffirmed in Historia
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Ecclesiastica, where, arguing against people that claims to know the ways of divine action,
he identifies only three notions of God intelligible to men.
The hidden nature of God is examined. They try to know what, when,
why, and how He wills and acts.
Beyond his work, his sacred laws and his name to be feared, men cannot 
know anything about the Deity.52
21 Hobbes states that his works, his sacred laws, and his name are the three only notions of
God knowable to human mind. Indeed, in De Motu, he maintains that men know only one
attribute of God, that is, existence53, but — as Paganini correctly points out54 — he declares,
in the same work,  that  existence can only be affirmed empirically,  and not  logically
demonstrated.55 Moreover, as we know, to engage in a demonstration of the existence of
God is simply “contrary to philosophy”. 
22 We must return, therefore, to the quoted passage of Historia Ecclesiastica, and carefully
consider separately the three notions of God considered by Hobbes: his works, his laws,
and his name.  A difficulty immediately emerges about the first aspect. In fact, we can
consider a work of God the creation, i.e. natural universe, or — according to the medieval
tradition of the potentia Dei absoluta56 — also God’s supernatural and direct action that
alter the regular order of nature, i.e. the miracle. Leaving aside at the moment the problem
of miracle (to which we will return later on), and by interpreting the works of God as
creation only, we lack of an adequate means of determining whether, and in what way,
the natural universe is actually the result of God’s action. In fact, as we have already
observed, investigation of the natural world and of its order, on natural causes and their
effects, do not lead at all to the knowledge and existence of God and there is, therefore,
no way of knowing if the natural world is actually the production of an omnipotent being.
This idea, that from the existence of the world we could infer that it is made by God is
actually openly contested in Hobbes’ Objections (1640) to Descartes’s Meditations:
I can construct for myself a sort of image of creation from what I have seen, e.g. a
man being born or growing as it were from a single point to the size and shape
which now has. This is the only sort of idea which anyone has in connection with
the term ‘creator’.  But our ability to imagine the world to have been created is  not a
sufficient proof of the creation. 57 
In conclusion, the philosophical inquiry about natural phenomena, and their causes, does
not allow to philosophically demonstrate the reality and the existence of God.
 
Divine laws, prophets, and miracles
Divine natural laws, and prophetic.
23 The  second  attribute  of  God  knowable  to  man,  that  Hobbes  presents  in  his  Historia
Ecclesiastica is “his sacred laws.” What does he mean by laws of God? In Leviathan (Chapter
31), he affirms that “God declareth his Lawes three wayes; by the Dictates of Naturall
Reason, by Revelation, and by the Voyce of some man, to whom by the operation of
Miracles, he procureth credit with the rest.”58 This necessarily implies the existence of
different divine laws and, in De Cive, as and in the same Leviathan, Hobbes distinguishes
two categories of divine laws: natural, and positive.59 In De Cive, he affirms that “Natural law
is the law which God has revealed to all men through his eternal word which is innate in
them, namely by natural reason.”60 On the contrary, “Positive law is that law which God has
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revealed to us through the prophetic word by which he spoke to men as a man; such are the
laws which he gave to the Jews about their constitution [politia] and divine worship.”61
From that, it follows that two different kingdoms must be attributed to God: 
There is the Natural Kingdom in which he rules through the dictates of right reason.
It is a universal kingdom over all who acknowledge the divine power because of the
rational nature which is common to all. And there is the Prophetic Kingdom, where
too he rules, but by his Prophetic Word.62 
24 The principles of natural law are universal and can be identified with the dictates of
natural reason. In the first chapters of De Cive Hobbes offers the definitions of natural
reason and law of nature, and from these definitions it is clear that the laws of nature
coincide with the precepts of right reason.63 However, we must remember what Hobbes
means by “right reason:” “By right reason in men’s natural state, I mean, not, as many do, an
infallible Faculty, but the act of reasoning, that is, a man’s own true Reasoning about actions of his
which may conduce to his advantage or other men’s loss.”64 Hobbes thus makes the right reason
coincide  with  the  individual  reasoning  that  leads  each  man  to  evaluate  means  for
obtaining advantage, and avoiding disadvantages.65 Although Hobbes argues that natural
law is written in our hearts “by the finger of God,”66 it is evident from De Cive — as well as
from Leviathan — that this natural law does not at all present that criterion of universality
which is required from an innate law, inscribed in human nature directly by God. Hobbes’
natural  law  is  much  more  a  practical  and  utilitarian  principle,  which  emerges
spontaneously in human nature, from the consideration of what is useful or harmful for
individual’s well-being. It is Hobbes himself, in his Answer to the Catching of Leviathan, who
confirms this reading, and radically modifies the interpretation of the laws of nature as
divine decrees. Here, he confirms that the laws of nature “were the laws of God, then
when they were delivered in the word of God; but before, being not known by men for
any thing but their own natural reason, they were but theorems, tending to peace, and
those uncertain, as being but conclusions of particular men, and therefore not properly
laws.”67 In fact, this idea can already be found in De Cive,68 and we can remark from the
quoted passage that the laws of nature configure, therefore, as conclusions of individual
men, which acquire the status of laws only through the revelation of God’s word. Indeed,
it is only the confirmation by the word of God that remove any doubt about the truth and
the validity of these laws of nature. However, this implies a not negligible consequence. If
we think that the laws of nature are confirmed in their divine origin only through the
revelation of God, this implies a shifting of the divine natural law into the sphere of divine
positive  law,  which  means  that  the  natural kingdom of  God  is  incorporated  into  the
prophetic one. It is not by chance that Hobbes repeatedly stresses in Leviathan that the
natural kingdom does not consist of a real kingdom.69 Moreover, since the laws of nature
can only ever be conclusions made by individuals, or theorems with a doubtful effect,
they are far from exhibiting a criterion of universality required to a law of nature derived
from God.
25 In conclusion, Hobbes’ attempt to support a convergence between natural and positive
laws turns out to be difficult and, instead of confirming the divine origin of the dictates of
natural reason, makes the law of nature even more problematic, forcing us to turn our
investigation into the second kingdom that  Hobbes  attributed to  God in De Cive and
Leviathan, that is, to the prophetic one.
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Prophets, inspiration, and revelation
26 The topics of the prophetic kingdom, of the revelation, and of the miracles have already
been extensively  discussed  in  critical  literature.70 It  is  not  necessary  to  present  and
discuss here the whole panorama of different interpretations on this subject, but it is
instead useful to highlight some aspects. In Leviathan, Hobbes presents three ways God
uses to make man know his laws:  natural  reason,  revelation,  and the voice of  some man
confirmed by miracles. To these three forms of communication, Hobbes relates a “triple
word  of  God,  Rational,  Sensible,  and  Prophetique,  to  which  Correspondeth  a  triple
Hearing; Right Reason, Sense Supernaturall, and Faith. As for Sense Supernaturall, which
consisteth in Revelation, or Inspiration, there have not been any Universall  Lawes so
given, because God speaketh not in that manner, but to particular persons, and to divers
men divers things.”71 This would seem to exclude that the sense  supernatural,  that is,
revelation, or inspiration, may have been the means through which God communicated its
universal laws, because revelation consists in a private phenomenon, reserved to some
particular men, who God granted with his favor. Hobbes is even often sceptic and critic
about those who “possessed of  an opinion of  being inspired.” Indeed,  “if  there were
nothing else that bewrayed their madnesse; yet that very arrogating such inspiration to
themselves,  is  argument  enough.”72 Moreover,  inspiration  — although  indicated  by
Hobbes as one of the means used by God to manifest his will — is also counted among the
kinds of madness accurately described in the Chapter 8 of Leviathan, in a passage that
reveals all the pungent irony of Hobbes:
If some man in Bedlam should entertaine you with sober discourse; and you desire
in taking leave, to know what he were, that you might another time requite his
civility; and he should tell you, he were God the Father; I think you need expect no
extravagant  action  for  argument  of  his  Madnesse.  This  opinion  of  Inspiration,
called commonly, Private Spirit, begins very often, from some lucky finding of an
Errour generally held by others […]
The opinions of the world, both in ancient and later ages, concerning the cause of
madnesse,  have  been  two.  Some  deriving  them  from  the  Passions;  some,  from
Daemons, or Spirits,  either good or bad, which they thought might enter into a
man, possesse him, and move his organs in such strange and uncouth manner, as
mad-men use to do. The former sort therefore, called such men, Mad-men: but the
Later,  called  them  sometimes  Daemoniacks, (that  is,  possessed  with  spirits;)
sometimes Energumeni,  (that is, agitated or moved with spirits;) and now in Italy
they are called not onely Pazzi, Mad-men; but also Spiritati, men possest.73
27 Again,  in  Chapter  34,  we  read  that  the  syntagma  “God’s  spirit”  can  sometimes  be
understood as “inclination to godlinesse, and Gods service,” but also it can be interpreted “for
any eminent ability,  or  extraordinary passion,  or  disease of  the mind, as when great
wisdom is called the spirit of wisdome; and mad men are said to be possessed with a spirit.”74 
28 In conclusion, inspiration is therefore considered by Hobbes primarily a kind of madness
or mental illness, that afflicts those who believe to have spoken with God or to have
directly inspired by Him, and it is not by chance that he rules out that revelation or
inspiration could be the means adopted by God to communicate its general laws to men.
On the contrary, Hobbes identified God’s privileged instrument for the foundation of the
positive divine law, and consequently of its prophetic kingdom, in the “Voyce of some
man, to whom (…) by the operation of Miracles, he procureth credit with the rest,”75 that
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is, a prophet. Hobbes writes that he found three meanings of the term prophet in Sacred
Scripture: 
The name of PROPHET, signifieth in Scripture sometimes Prolocutor; that is, he that
speaketh from God to Man,  or from man to God:  And sometimes Praedictor, or  a
foreteller of things to come: And sometimes one that speaketh incoherently, as men
that are distracted. It is most frequently used in the sense of speaking from God to
the People. So Moses, Samuel, Elijah, Isaiah, Ieremiah, and others were Prophets.76
29 If we do not want to consider a messenger of God “one that speaketh incoherently, as
men are  distracted,”  we  must  suppose  that  the  laws  of  God were  communicated by
biblical  prophets  who acted  as  intermediaries  between God and the  people,  such  as
Moses, Samuel, and the others. Yet, considering that those who claim to be inspired by
God  sometimes  turn  out  to  be  insane,  it  is  evident  that  even  a  fool  could  easily
impersonate  a  God’s  messenger.  Bramhall  underlines  this  problem,  maintaining  that
Hobbes “maketh very little difference between a prophet and a madman, and a demoniac.”77 
Hobbes was himself aware of this problem as made evident, in Chapter 32 of Leviathan,
where he elicits two criteria for distinguishing true and false prophets:
How then can he, to whom God hath never revealed his Wil immediately (saving by
the way of  natural  reason) know when he is  to obey,  or  not  to obey his  Word,
delivered by him, that sayes he is a Prophet? (…) To which I answer out of the Holy
Scripture, that there be two marks, by which together, not asunder, a true Prophet
is  to be known.  One is  the  doing of  miracles;  the other  is  the  not  teaching any other
Religion than that which is already established.78
30 Hobbes explicitly recommends that the two marks should be present jointly,  and not
separately, but the second mark involves a non-negligible difficulty. Indeed, by literally
sticking to what Hobbes says, one should consider Jesus Christ a false prophet, for He
departed,  sometimes  openly,  from  the  established  religion.  Skipping  this  significant
difficulty, it is important, however, to examine the first criterion required by Hobbes to
ascertain that under the mask of a self-styled prophet there is no hiding an impostor, that
is, doing of miracles.
 
Miracles, marks, and visions 
31 The notion of the miracle is an extremely important issue in Hobbes’ theological thought:
the  miracle  is  the  pivotal  element  on  which  the  distinction  between  true and  false
prophets is founded. It is, therefore, of a paramount importance to correctly determine
the miraculous nature of an event. On the other hand, the problem of determining the
truth or falsity of miracles is not, according to Hobbes, a dilemma concerning his epoch:
Seeing therefore Miracles now cease, we have no sign left, whereby to acknowledge
the pretended Revelations or Inspirations of any private man; nor obligation to give
ear to any Doctrine, farther than it is conformable to the Holy Scriptures, which
since the time of our Saviour, supply the place, and sufficiently recompense the
want of all other Prophecy.79
32 Likewise,  in his  Answer,  Hobbes denies that  ‘true prophets’  still  exist  in his  time.  He
writes, indeed, that “those prophets that from the mouth of God foretell things future, or
do other miracle (…) I deny there has been any since the death of St. John the Evangelist.”80
Then, to clarify this problem we must investigate what the miracle consists of, and why
the  contemporary  age  is  completely  devoid  of  miracles.  The  definition of  miracle  is
offered  by  Hobbes  in  Leviathan,  Chapter  37:  “A MIRACLE, is  a  work  of  God,  (besides  his
operation by the way of Nature, ordained in the Creation,) done, for the making manifest to his
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elect,  the mission of  an extraordinary Minister for  their  salvation.”81 This definition—which
appeals to the supernatural action of God82—seems to dispel any doubt about what can be
considered  a  miracle.  It  is  not  clear,  however,  why since  the  death  of  St.  John  the
Evangelist,  God definitively suspended all  his  supernatural  actions.  Other passages of
Leviathan are just as awkward, since Hobbes claims that even “the works of the Egyptian
Sorcerers, though not so great as those of Moses, yet were great miracles.”83 This statement
completely overthrows the image of miracle, and requires a more in-depth analysis of
this issue. Hobbes dedicates an entire chapter of Leviathan (Chapter 37), to the topic of The
miracles,  and  their  function.  Here,  he  argues  that  “To  understand therefore  what  is  a
Miracle, we must first understand what works they are, which men wonder at, and call
Admirable.”84
And there be but two things which make men wonder at any event: The one is, if it
be strange, that is to say, such, as the like of it hath never, or very rarely been
produced: The other is, if when it is produced, we cannot imagine it to have been
done by naturall means, but onely by the immediate hand of God. But when we see
some possible, naturall cause of it, how rarely soever the like has been done; or if
the like have been often done, how impossible soever it be to imagine a naturall
means thereof, we no more wonder, nor esteem it for a Miracle.85
33 There are thus two requirements in order in defining miraculous an event: firstly, its
strangeness,  that  is,  its  extreme rarity;  secondly,  the  impossibility  to  understand its
natural cause. This last consideration inevitably recalls the four causes of the origin of
religion, and the relationship between religion and philosophy. As we know, faced with
inexplicable events or difficult to understand, when it is impossible to discover the real
natural  causes  of  phenomena,  men are  inevitably  disposed to  imagine,  or  fancy, the
existence of a (false?) supernatural cause. Therefore, even to the phenomenology of the
miracle it could be applied the same interpretation emerged in considering the genesis of
religion. It is not by chance, that “The First Rainbow that was seen in the world, was a
Miracle, because the first; and consequently strange.”86 In conclusion:
Furthermore, seeing Admiration and Wonder, is consequent to the knowledge and
experience, wherewith men are endued, some more, some lesse; it followeth, that
the same thing, may be a Miracle to one, and not to another. And thence it is, that
ignorant, and superstitious men make great Wonders of those works, which other
men,  knowing  to  proceed  from  Nature,  (which  is  not  the  immediate,  but  the
ordinary work of God,) admire not at all: As when Ecclipses of the Sun and Moon
have been taken for supernaturall works, by the common people.87
34 In other words, whether or not a natural phenomenon is miraculous depends on our
knowledge and experience only. Therefore, ignorant and superstitious people are more
inclined to consider as a miracle any extraordinary event that goes beyond the limits of
their  modest  understanding.  Nonetheless,  with  the  development  of  philosophy  and
knowledge, the number of events that can be considered prodigious is greatly reduced,
and it is for this reason the miracles have ceased, because there are no such ingenuous
people to be influenced by rare natural events. Hobbes is very clear about this when he
states: “I do not know one man, that ever saw any such wondrous work, done by the
charm, or at the word, or prayer of a man, that a man endued but with a mediocrity of
reason, would think supernaturall.”88
35 From this interpretation of  the miracle new difficulties arise.  As we know, “doing of
miracles” is one of the two requirements for distinguishing true from false prophets, but
this explanation of the miracle makes it very difficult — if not impossible — to ascertain
the  trustworthiness  of  the  self-proclaimed  prophet,  and  thus  finally  question  the
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possibility of receiving laws and commands from God. The miracle is actually the only
proof that can be given by a supposed prophet to prove to his people that he has the
approval of God. Nevertheless, if the miracle consists instead in a natural event, of which
man  cannot  find  a  plausible  explanation,  any  criterion  to  determine  if  a  man  who
presents himself as a prophet is actually a messenger of God is inevitably lacking. To
overcome this difficulty, we will examine some passages of Leviathan, which are mirrored
in other Hobbes’ works. In Chapter 37, Hobbes states, with regard to the miracle, that “A
private man has alwaies the liberty, (because thought is free,) to beleeve, or not beleeve
in his heart, those acts that have been given out for Miracles.”89 But, “when it comes to
confession of that faith, the Private Reason must submit to the Publique.”90 A very similar
argument is maintained regarding the contents of the religious creed:
[…] that they to whom God hath no spoken immediately, are to receive the positive
commandements  of  God,  from  their  Soveraign  (…)  And  consequently  in  every
Common-wealth, they who have no supernatural revelation to the contrary, ought
to obey the laws of  their  own sovereign,  in the external  acts  and profession of
religion.91
36 Hobbes speaks of “external acts and profession,” and it is not by chance, that in De Homine
,  religion is explicitly defined as a practice of external worship.92 Moreover, from the
Answer  to  the  Catching  of  Leviathan we know that  “to obey is  one thing,  to  believe is
another”, because “belief requires teachers and arguments drawn either from reason,”93
and, the public religion requires, on the contrary, the will to obedience only. This is what
Hobbes means in Leviathan by “Captivity of our Understanding.”
But  by  the  Captivity  of  our  Understanding,  is  not  meant  a  Submission  of  the
Intellectuall faculty, to the Opinion of any other man; but of the Will to Obedience,
where obedience is due. For Sense, Memory, Understanding, Reason, and Opinion
are not in our power to change; but alwaies, and necessarily such, as the things we
see, hear, and consider suggest unto us; and therefore are not effects of our Will,
but our Will of them. We then Captivate our Understanding and Reason, when we
forbear  contradiction;  when  we  so  speak,  as  (by  lawfull  Authority)  we  are
commanded;  and  when  we  live  accordingly;  which  in  sum,  is  Trust,  and  Faith
reposed in him that speaketh, though the mind be incapable of any Notion at all
from the Words spoken.94
37 Hobbes openly claims that even those who believe to have received revelation, that is, the
prophets, could not have spoken directly with God. He writes “I find not any place that
proveth God spake to them supernaturally.”95 Therefore, “So that by the Spirit is meant
Inclination to Gods service; and not any supernaturall Revelation.”96 Indeed, he believes
that God cannot properly “speak” to men, if not, using apparitions or visions.97 But, what
do these visions consist of? Hobbes clearly explains it, by referring to Moses:
And yet this speaking of God to Moses, was by mediation of an Angel, or Angels, as
appears expressly, Acts 7. Ver. 35. and 53. and Gal. 3. 19, and was therefore a Vision,
though a more cleer vision than was given to other Prophets. And conformable
hereunto, where God saith (Deut. 13. 1) If there arise amongst you a Prophet, or Dreamer
of Dreams, the later word is but the interpretation of the former.98
38 The  conclusion  of  this  quotation  is  decisive:  the  term  prophet  is  equivalent  to  the
periphrasis “Dreamer of Dreams,” because “To say that he (i.e. God) hath spoken to him in a
Dream, is no more then to say he dreamed that God spake to him.”99 Finally, in Chapter
45, Hobbes clarifies once and for all what dreams and visions consist of, whether natural
or  supernatural:  “Visions, and  Dreams ,  whether  naturall,  or  supernaturall,  are  but
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Phantasms.”100 He  also  provides  an  extensive  explanation  about  the  nature  of  these
phantasms: 
An IMAGE (in the most strict signification of the word) is the Resemblance of some
thing visible: In which sense the Phantasticall Formes, Apparitions, or Seemings of
visible Bodies to the Sight, are onely Images; such as are the Shew of a man, or other
thing in the Water, by Reflection, or Refraction; or of the Sun, or Stars by Direct
Vision in the Air; which are nothing reall in the things seen, nor in the place where
they seem to bee; nor are their magnitudes and figures the same with that of the
object; but changeable, by the variation of the organs of Sight, or by glasses; and are
present  oftentimes  in  our  Imagination,  and  in  our  Dreams,  when  the  object  is
absent;  or  changed into other colours,  and shapes,  as  things that  depend onely
upon the Fancy. And these are the Images, which are originally and most properly
called Ideas, and IDOLS, and derived from the language of the Graecians, with whom
the word Eiòdw signifieth to See. They are also called PHANTASMES, which is in the
same language, Apparitions. And from these Images it is that one of the faculties of
mans Nature, is called the Imagination.101
39 Finally, seeming to reiterate the inadmissibility of this sort of supernatural visions,
Hobbes states again:
It is also evident, that there can be no Image of a thing Infinite: for all the Images,
and Phantasmes that are made by the Impression of things visible, are figured: but
Figure is a quantity every way determined. And therefore there can bee no Image of
God; nor of the Soule of Man; nor of Spirits; but onely of Bodies Visible…102
40 These considerations about the nature of miracles, prophecy, and visions take away any
credit  to  any  self-styled  prophet,  and  leave  us  totally  lacking  of  correct  criteria  to
establish whether or not a doctrine must be accepted as the word of God. How can we
determine the content  of  the true religious  doctrine? How to identify  the principles
necessary  for  salvation?  In Chapter  43  of Leviathan ,  Hobbes  identifies  a  single
fundamental article, an unum necessarium: “Jesus is the Christ.”103 However, even on this
element it is opportune to make some clarifications. Firstly, in Chapter 46 of the same
work, titled Of the OFFICE of our BLESSED SAVIOUR, Christ is considered, in fact, like Moses,
simply a lieutenant of God:
Seeing  therefore  the  authority  of  Moses  was  but  subordinate,  and  hee  but  a
Lieutenant to God; it followeth, that Christ, whose authority, as man, was to bee like
that of Moses, was no more but subordinate to the authority of his Father. (…) Our
Saviour therefore, both in Teaching, and Reigning, representeth (as Moses did) the
Person of  God;  which God from that time forward,  but not before,  is  called the
Father; and being still one and the same substance, is one Person as represented by
Moses, and another Person as represented by his Sonne the Christ. For Person being
a relative to a Representer, it is consequent to plurality of Representers, that there
be a plurality of Persons, though of one and the same Substance.104
41 Secondly, the definition of Jesus as the Christ, according to Hobbes, is taken from the
Scriptures, and “it is manifest, that none can know they are Gods Word, (though all true
Christians beleeve it,) but those to to whom God himself hath revealed it supernaturally.”
105 Finally, the syntagma “word of God” can be understood in two ways: either as a word
pronounced by God,  or as a word referring to God,  and, according to Hobbes, Scripture is
called word of God only in the second sense.106 
42 Therefore, even the unum necessarium proves to be inadequate to express the real content
of the “word of God,” forcing us to look elsewhere, to find other more stable principles to
determine what must be accepted as a commandment by God.
Nothing but the Name of God. Hobbes on Theology and Religion
Les Dossiers du Grihl , Libertinage, athéisme, irréligion. Essais et bibliographie
13
Every man therefore ought to consider who is the Soveraign Prophet; that is to say,
who it is, that is Gods Vicegerent on Earth; and hath next under God, the Authority
of Governing Christian men; and to observe for a Rule, that Doctrine, which in the name
of God, hee hath commanded to bee taught; and thereby to examine and try out the
truth of those Doctrines, which pretended Prophets with miracle, or without, (…)
For when Christian men, take not their Christian Soveraign, for Gods Prophet; they
must either take their owne Dreames, for the Prophecy they mean to bee governed
by, and the tumour of their own hearts for the Spirit of God…107
43 When men do not turn to the sovereign, and therefore to the laws of the Commonwealth,
to determine what they must accept as the word of God, they end up letting themselves
be guided by “their owne Dreames,” or be governed by “the tumour of their own hearts,” that
is, by passions. Hobbes coincides the precepts of religious creed with the laws issued by
civil  authority,  an  idea  re-asserted  also  in  Behemoth.  In  this  text,  Character  B,  who
embodies Hobbes, affirms: 
There is no Nation in the world whose Religion is not established and receius not its
Authority from the Laws of that Nation. It is true that the Law of God receius no
euidence from the Laws of  men.  But because men neuer by their  own wisdome
come to knowledge of what God [>hath] spoken and commanded to be obserued,
nor be obliged to obey the Laws whose Author they know not, they are acquiesse in
some humane Authority or other.108
44 Briefly, there is no possibility at all for men to know directly the commandments and the
word of God. They must adhere to human authority, i.e. the authority that already holds
power,  by virtue of a pact previously stipulated at the time of the foundation of the
Commonwealth. Moreover, the sovereign must make use of religion because, “it is that
the multitude should euer learne their duty but from the Pulpit.”109 This is also confirmed
by Historia Ecclesiastica, where Hobbes maintains that “The one and only thing joining
those of various opinion together as a / people, is that they think the orders of their king
are the orders of God.”110
45 This being so, it is not surprising that Bishop Bramhall accuses Hobbes of reducing “the
culture and improvement” of religion only to “policy.”111
 
Beyond the name of God: unmoved mover, infinite
universe, and incorporeal substances
46 If we return to the passage of Historia Ecclesiastica, in which Hobbes indicates the three
elements of God knowable by man, we must recognize that the investigation about God’s
works and sacred laws turned out to be vain. The search for the ultimate causes of natural
phenomena, and the analysis of laws of Gods, both natural and positive, do not at all
reveal their supernatural origin. The third and last attribute quoted by Hobbes is the
name of God, but it  is not very clear what Hobbes means. In Leviathan,  Chapter 3,  he
actually states that “the Name of God is used, not to make us conceive him; (for he is
Incomprehensible;  and his  greatnesse,  and power are unconceivable;)  but  that  we may
honour him.”112 The name of God is thus used exclusively venerate and worship him, but
for all that concerns his attributes, he is absolutely incomprehensible. This idea is already
clearly expressed in Chapter 15 of De Cive, where Hobbes affirms that we know absolutely
nothing about God, and that we can refer to him only by using negative expressions (as
infinite, eternal, incomprehensible), superlative, or indefinite.113 In these observations, we are
confronted with two substantial problems. Firstly, how can we know that God exists, if we
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have  no  knowledge  of  him?  But  there  is  another,  even  greater  difficulty:  Hobbes
conceives infinity and eternity exclusively as negative notions, referring to them as that
which surpasses a limited human understanding, and, as we shall see, this conception is
problematic in relation to his idea of God.114
47 In order to discuss the impossibility of knowing any attribute of God, we must first refer
to the principles of Hobbes’ gnoseology. According to Hobbes, all knowledge comes from
the  senses.  This  idea,  already  emerged  in  the  Elements  of  Law,115 is  restated  in  his
controversy with Descartes, regarding the Meditations.116 In his Objections, Hobbes presents
some cornerstones of  his  philosophy,  proposing his  conception of  reason as  a  logical
calculation, operated on the names (an idea reaffirmed later in De Motu and in Leviathan),117
and affirms that men can know only finite things. Hobbes elaborates on this idea more in
Chapter 3 of Leviathan, a few years later, where he argues that “Whatsoever we imagine, is
Finite. Therefore there is no Idea, or conception of any thing we call Infinite.”118
48 How can we be sure of the existence of God if the senses do not allow us to infer the
existence of  something infinite? Hobbes explicitly addresses the problem in the fifth
objection, addressed against Descartes’s third meditation:
It seems, then, that there is no idea of God in us. A man born blind, who has often
approached fire and felt hot, recognizes that there is something which makes him
hot; and when he hears that this is called ‘fire’ he concludes that fire exists. But he
does not know what shape or colour fire has, and has absolutely no idea or image of
fire that comes before his mind. The same applies to a man who recognizes that
there must be some cause of his images or ideas, and that this cause must have a
prior cause, and so on; he is finally led to the supposition of some eternal cause
which never began to exist and hence cannot have a cause prior to itself, and he
concludes that something eternal must necessarily exist. But he has no idea which
he can say is the idea of that eternal being; he merely gives the name or label ‘God’
to the thing that he believes in, or acknowledges to exist.119
49 The image of the blind born was already present in the Elements,120 and more broadly is
distinctive of Hobbes’ philosophy.121 However, even if the blind man cannot have any
phantasm of  an  object  acquired through  vision,  nevertheless,  he  may  have  other
phantasms of it, produced by the other senses. On the contrary, men cannot have any
perception at all of God’s existence. At most, starting from senses, and from the existence
of external objects, they could arrive to a “supposition of some eternal cause which never
began to exist and hence cannot have a cause prior to itself.”122 The problem thus comes
back to the question of the existence of God, conceived as a prima causa, or as the first
mover of the universe. This problem has been addressed by several scholars,123 who
suggest makin a distinction between two different meanings of God in Hobbes’ works: the
biblical God, who is also a pivotal element in Hobbes politics; and the philosophical God, a
concept that represents an essential element in his natural philosophy. Indeed, in his
works, we can also find some rare references to God as a creator; whose the most explicit
in a passage from Decameron physiologicum (1678), and which seems to anticipate, in some
respects,  Newton’s  design  argument.124 However ,  with  regard  to  our  analysis,  the
philosophical notion of God is undoubtedly the more interesting, and it identifies Him
with the first mover, as this passage from the Elements of Law clearly states:
For the effects we acknowledge naturally, do necessarily include a power of their
producing,  before they were produced;  and that power presupposeth something
existent that hath such power; and the thing so existing with power to produce, if it
were not eternal, must needs have been produced by something else before that: till
we come to eternal, that is to say, to the first power of all powers, and first cause of
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all  causes.  And this is  it  which men call  by the name of GOD:  implying eternity,
incomprehensibility, and omnipotency.125
50 On the other hand, the possibility to philosophically demonstrate the existence of God is
contested by Hobbes, as we know, both in the tenth objection to the third Descartes’s
meditation,126 as well as in the De Motu.127 Once again, Hobbes seems to contradict himself,
and  to  overcome  this  difficulty  it  is  necessary  to  examine  the  principles  of  his
philosophical  system  a  little  more  in  detail.  Since  his  very  first  writings,  Hobbes
maintains that all the universe is purely material, and affirms that it is inhabited by only
two principles: matter and motion.128 This materialistic conception of the world, already
present in the Elements and his Objections to Descartes’s Meditations, is very explicit in De
Motu, where Hobbes completely identifies the notions of ens and corpus.129 Indeed,  he
states that body and material are, ultimately, “names of the same thing — this is because
‘thing’ is interpreted in different ways.”130 Indeed, “When considered simpliciter, an object
that exists is termed ‘body’, but when considered as capable of assuming a new form or a
new shape the same body is called ‘material’.”131 To this materialistic approach, Hobbes
associates an idea of motion inherited from Galileo,132 which leads him to this formulation
of the principle of inertia:
First, it is agreed that nothing begins to move of itself, but that everything moves
for a reason, and has as the initiator of its own motion the movement of some body
that touches it.  This is so because — to put it briefly — a body, once it starts to
move,  has  within  itself  everything  necessary  for  motion.  (…)  But  just  as  for
[generating] motion in a body at rest,  so for [generating] rest in a moved body,
some agent is necessary that is external to, and with the body.133
51 Therefore, if the universe is composed of matter and motion only, and the principle of
inertia suggests that the motion cannot be transmitted if not by a moved and contiguous
body, it follows that the first mover must then also be corporeal. Not surprisingly, in De
Corpore (where we find a more precise formulation of some ideas already present in De
Motu), Hobbes reiterates that “causa motus, nulla esse potest in corpore nisi contiguo et moto,”
134 and he openly attacks,  in Chapter 26,  the Aristotelian conception of the unmoved
mover, present in the book L of Metaphysics.135 He maintains, indeed, that “every object is
either a part of the whole world, or an aggregate of parts,”136 by reiterating what already
claimed in Chapter 46 of Leviathan, “every part of the Universe, is Body; and that which is
not Body, is no part of the Universe: And because the Universe is All, that which is no part
of it, is Nothing; and consequently no where.”137
52 The universe therefore includes all the entia, that is all the bodies. What is not body, is
evidently  no part  of  the  universe,  and,  according to  Hobbes,  is  simply  nothing.  As  a
consequence, even the first mover — in addition to being perpetually in motion — must
also necessarily be corporeal. The thesis of the corporeity of God explicitly emerges,138 for
the first time, in 1668, in the Appendix to the Latin edition of Leviathan.139 Here, citing
Tertullian, Hobbes claims that God is also a body, because “Whatever is not a body is not
an entity.”140 In fact, he had been forced to affirm the corporeity of God, following the
attack of Bramhall, who accused him of confusing God, if not with the universe, at least
with nature, because those “who deny all incorporeal substances, can understand nothing
by God, but either nature, (not naturam naturantem, that is, a real author of nature, but
naturam naturatam, that is, the orderly concourse of natural causes, as T. H. seemeth to
intimate).”141 In his  Answer,  Hobbes admits that  his  philosophical  position necessarily
implies the corporeity of God: “I mean by the universe, the aggregate of all things that
have being in themselves; and so do all men else. And because God has a being, if follows
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that he is either the whole universe, or part of it.”142 Closed in the grip of Bramhall,
Hobbes is forced to recognize that his philosophy left no room for other interpretations:
God must coincide with the whole universe, or with a part of it. However, as Thomas
Tenison correctly points out in his The Creed of  Mr.  Hobbes examined,  to safeguard the
infinity that is dutifully attributed to God, we must necessarily conclude that the only
plausible alternative is that God coincides with the “aggregate of all things that have
being in themselves”, that is, with the universe.143 Indeed, if the whole is always greater
than the sum of its parts, and if we suppose that God corresponds to a part of the universe
only, we must necessarily conclude that there is something greater than God. Tenison
also underlines another difficulty in Hobbes’ thought: Hobbes maintains that all things
are material, but it is impossible for matter to create matter. Consequently, either matter
is created by some immaterial entity, which, as we know, is impossible, or matter must
necessarily be eternal. Tenison attributes the idea of the eternity of matter to Hobbes, by
referring to a passage of chapter 8 of De Corpore,144 where he reveals his sympathies for a
Democritean and Lucretian conception of matter:
When we say a living creature, a tree, or any other specified body is generated or 
destroyed, it is not to be so understood as if there were made a body of that which is
not-body, or not a body of a body, but of a living creature not a living creature, of a
tree, &c. that is, that those accidents for which we call one thing a living creature,
another  thing  a  tree,  and  another  by  some  another  name,  are  generated  and
destroyed; (…). And therefore, philosophers, who tie themselves to natural reason,
suppose that a body can neither be generated nor destroyed…145
53 This idea is already present in De Motu, although expressed in a less explicit form,146 and
in both works Hobbes argues that the individual and corruptible bodies are aggregated
composed  by  a  unique  eternal  matter,  which  always  remains  the  same,  despite  the
modifications to which transient and corruptible bodies are subjected.
54 Hobbes’ considerations about the eternity of matter seem to support the hypothesis that
his God coincides with the universe, uncreated and eternal. A passage from Chapter 26 of
De Corpore apparently seems to confirm that. Here Hobbes writes: “I cannot therefore
commend those  that  boast  they  have  demonstrated,  by reasons  drawn from natural
things, that the world had a beginning.”147 
55 An interpretation of Hobbes as a “pantheist” ante-litteram was apparently quite diffused in
17th and 18th centuries. François Peleau, a French admirer of Hobbes, in a letter dated
March 1,  1657,  asked him a confirmation for his argument about the impossibility of
distinguishing God from the world.148 About a century later, in the Encyclopédie,  Denis
Diderot wrote that even if he was not atheist, his religion differed very little from that of
Spinoza.149 Must we conclude, thus, together with Diderot, that Hobbes’ conception of God
is comparable to that defended in Spinoza’s Ethics?150
56 Without going into the matter concerning Spinoza’s God,151 we must observe, however,
that Hobbes has a radically different conception of infinity.152 Indeed, he considers the
concept of infinity as totally inaccessible to man, and he even denies the existence of any
positive conception of the infinite. For Hobbes, words like quidditas, nunc stans, typical of
the Scholasticism,153 are meaningless, since the idea of temporal infinity can be conceived
only as a succession of endless instants, that is, as indefinite.154 This negative conception of
infinity is  also present  in Hobbes’  scientific  works,  for  example in De Corpore,  where
Hobbes states that “Also, number is infinite, is a false proposition; for no number can be
infinite, but only the word number is then called an indefinite name when there is no
determined number answering to it in the mind.”155
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57 As Bramhall correctly points out, this negative conception of infinity does not square well
with the infinity which must be attributed to God. Defending this idea of infinity, we are
forced to infer that even God — as well as the universe if the two concepts eventually
coincide — is indefinite. In addition to this not inconsiderable difficulty, there are two
other  passages,  respectively  from  De  Cive, and  from  Leviathan,  which  make  the
identification of God with the universe equally problematic. In De Cive, Chapter 15, Hobbes
writes:
58 What worship does natural reason assign to God? To answer this question, let us start from
his attributes; and in the first place, obviously, we must attribute existence to him. For
there can be no will to honour one whom we do not believe to exist. Is also obvious that
the philosophers who have said that the world itself or the soul (i.e. a part) of the world is
God,  have spoken unworthily of him; for they are giving him no attributes;  they are
denying his existence altogether. For by the name God is meant the cause of the world; and
those who say that the world is God, are saying that there is no cause of the world, i.e. that
there is no God.156
59 Nine  years  later,  in  Leviathan,  Hobbes  reiterates  the  same  idea,  expressed  in  almost
identical terms. In Chapter 31, we read that,
[…] those Philosophers, who said the World, or the Soule of the World was God,
spake unworthily of him; and denied his Existence: For by God, is understood the
cause of the World; and to say the World is God, is to say there is no cause of it, that
is, no God.157
60 This lead us to an impasse. Indeed, God must coincide with the first cause of the world,
but, as we know, this cause should be material, and all that exists and is material is even
necessarily a part of the universe. The focus of the question lies in the concept of cause.
Whoever excludes the existence of a cause external to the world, and supposes that the
world itself contains all the elements necessary for its genesis and development, must
necessarily also exclude the existence of God.158 In De Motu, arguing against White — who
claimed to  be  able  to  demonstrate  that  the  motion of  the  universe  derives  from an
external principle159 — Hobbes affirms that if we accept his conception of motion, based
on the principle of inertia, we must necessarily conclude that:
[…]  either  the  world  did  not  have  a  beginning  or  that  it  had  its  beginning  in
something incorporeal  or  in  incomprehensible  ens.  As has  now been proved,  [the
world] cannot have begun of itself or [originated] in another body, because it is
impossible to conceive a body outside the world, the world being the aggregate of
all bodies.160
61 And, “although each of the separated bodies of the universe is external to every other
body, none of them is ‘external’ with respect to the universe.”161 This reduces all possible
solutions about the problem of the causa prima to two alternatives: either the world is
supposed to have originated from an incorporeal body, that is inconceivable, or it must be
considered — together with Aristotle, and his Renaissance epigones162 — that the world is
eternal, thesis opposed by the whole Christian tradition and openly condemned in 1277,
in Paris.163 Of course, Hobbes proposes the first solution, stating that “motion, indeed, can
be naturally produced only by motion. The fact that God, being unmoved, yet moves,
[others] is not natural, but supernatural, and also above the human understanding.”164.
For  this  reason,  any  attempt  to  demonstrate  philosophically  the  existence  of  God is
considered simply “afiloso@fon,” and, despite the identification of the concept of ens and
corpus, Hobbes argues, in De Motu, that the existence of incorporeal substances is a dogma
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of faith.165 In paragraph 7, Chapter 26, he explains how a philosopher should react when
he stumbles into an article of faith:
[…] I say the philosopher is indeed free to enquire into the nature and cause of
motion,  but  that  as  the  investigation  proceeds,  and  he  wills  stumble  upon  a
proposition that is now held by the Christian faith, and thus seems to contradict a
conclusion he has established earlier, he can infer (if he has previously reasoned
correctly): ‘I do not understand under what meaning of terms that proposition is
true’. So, for instance, he says: ‘I do not see, or it is beyond my grasp, how that which
is not moved moves something else, or how that which exists is not in a [given] place,
or how something incorporeal sees, hears, understands, wills, loves, hates, etc.’166
62 According to Hobbes, philosophers can declare some articles of faith incomprehensible,
and therefore above their understanding, as, for example, to explain “how that which is not
moved moves something else.”167 Thus, the existence of a God, that is an incorporeal body
which  is  the  unmoved mover  of  the  universe,  cannot  be  conceived  through natural
reason, and then must be considered an article of faith, i.e. above human understanding.
In De Motu,  indeed, the existence of incorporeal substances is considered one of these
articles of faith:
[…] the heathens, noticing that, not only when they slept but also when they were
awake, certain spectra appeared in front of their eyes, and since they did not know
these were phantasms born from some violent passion of the mind, they were able
to consider them as external things, possessing dimensions. However, since these
images were seen to fade easily, they did not consider them as bodies, they called
them spirits, wishing to give them a name for very thin bodies. Indeed, those who
are ignorant, consider natural things not by their dimensions, but by their opacity,
and thus retain empty which is penetrable to the vision. This could explain how
people came to believe in the existence of innumerable daemons, both good and
bad  ones,  and  of  other  incorporeal  substances.  But  since  it  cannot  be  known  by
natural reason if some substances are incorporeal or not, it must be accepted as
true which is revealed supernaturally by God. Therefore, Christians recognized [the
existence] of this sort of substances, pushed by the authority of Sacred Scripture,
and not because of the reasons of the philosophers. This is a dogma of faith, and not
of science.168
63 In  subsequent  writings,  however,  Hobbes  openly  denies  the  existence  of  incorporeal
substances, and in 1668, in the cited Appendix of Leviathan, he even affirms the corporeity
of God. Once again, we are faced with an impasse: in De Motu, the existence of incorporeal
substances — among which Hobbes includes God, incorporeal body and unmoved mover
of the universe — is admitted on the basis of the authority of the Scripture, while in
Leviathan Hobbes declares he does not find any place in Scripture, in which the existence
of  incorporeal  substances  is  affirmed.169 However,  by  comparing  these  works,  an
interesting deduction can be made: the explanation of the natural origin of spectra and
visions is essentially identical in De Motu to the explication in Leviathan.170 In both of these
works,  visions  and spectra  are  nothing but  phantasms generated by some vehement
passion of the mind. Consequently, incorporeal substances, whose existence is affirmed in
De  Motu on  the  basis  of  Scripture,  seem  to  always  have  the  same  natural  and
anthropological explanation: their existence, as well as that of innumerable demons and
ghosts, is a belief generated by human passions.
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Conclusion
64 The difficulty to reconcile Hobbes’ discordant statements on the subject of the existence
of incorporeal substances makes the interpretation of his theological position even more
problematic. To overcome this difficulty, it could be assumed that Hobbes defends in De
Motu a  sort  of  fideism,  recommending  to  rely  on  revelation  for  what  concerns  the
existence  of  God and other  problematic  articles  of  faith.171 However,  this  solution is
problematic, since Hobbes is always decidedly skeptical about revelation, particularly in
Leviathan. Moreover, in De Motu — where he affirms, as we know, that “either the world
did not have a beginning or that it had its beginning in something incorporeal or in
incomprehensible ens” — Hobbes already supports the same conception of eternal matter
which is present later in De Corpore. This means that if the matter is eternal, and all that is
body is also part of the universe, it follows that the universe must be eternal. An eternity
conceived as a succession of endless instants could be problematic if attributed to God, as
Bramhall points out, but it is not for the universe. However, if we affirm that the universe
is  eternal,  it  means that  it  cannot  originate from a cause external  to  it,  and that  it
contains  in  itself  all  the  elements  suitable  for  its  development.  There  is  not,  in
Aristotelian sense, any “unmoved mover,” or an external, incorporeal, and inconceivable
cause that produced it.
65 The theological consequences of this conclusion are obvious: if there is something that
corresponds to the concept of God, this must necessarily coincide with the corporeal
universe. However, Hobbes’ position regarding the identification of God within the world:
“to say the World is God, is to say there is no cause of it, that is, no God.”172 How can we
then interpret this statement? Bramhall,  referring to a passage from De Cive, accuses
Hobbes of considering atheism more reasonable than superstition. In fact, this idea is not
necessarily  heterodox in  itself,  and it  is  already present  in  Francis  Bacon’s  Essays.173
However, in Hobbes this statement assumes a completely different meaning and value,
since it must be related to the natural origins of religious beliefs. In the De Cive, Chapter
16, we read:
Aware of their own weakness and in wonder at natural events, the human race has
developed an almost universal belief that an invisible God is the Workman who has
made all visible things; they also fear him, believing that they do not have adequate
self-protection in themselves. But their imperfect use of reason and the vigour of
their passions have prevented them from worshipping him rightly. The fear of the
invisible,  when  separated  from  right  reason,  is  superstition.  Without  special
assistance from God, it proved almost impossible to avoid the twin rocks of Atheism 
and superstition; for the latter proceeds from fear without right reason, the former
from an opinion of reason without fear.174
66 If  atheism  is  an  opinion  of  reason  without  fear  (rationis  opinione  sine  metu),  and,
conversely, superstition proceeds from the fear of the invisible, without right reason, it
follows that religion must be an opinion of reason accompanied by the fear of the invisible.
In  Leviathan,  the  origin  of  religious  beliefs  is  the  same,  essentially  natural  and
anthropological: religion is nothing but “Feare of power invisible,” but here Hobbes is
decidedly more radical.  He adds that this invisible power is “feigned by the mind, or
imagined from tales publiquely allowed.”175 Based on these statements, Leo Strauss and
Edwin Curley stress the devastating effect of Hobbes’ critique of religion, which would
destroy any theistic conception of God.176 Hobbes must therefore be considered a sort of
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“systematic atheist”, or an atheist “by consequence”, as Bramhall suggests,177 and with
him some eighteenth-century readers of Hobbes? 
67 Despite his caustic claims about religion and concerning the theistic idea of God, Hobbes
never explicitly denies its existence. This is not, of course, enough to exclude him from
the history of modern atheism, because before the late eighteenth century (and, to be
precise,  before  d’Holbach),  no  philosopher  has  the  audacity  to  confess openly,  and
explicitly, his  atheism. 178 Leaving aside the question concerning what modern atheism
exactly consists of, we must recognize that some 17th-century critics of Hobbes, despite
their  cultural  prejudices,  correctly  detect  the  impossibility  of  reconciling  his
philosophical  system with a coherent conception of  divinity.  Perhaps,  even the most
acute and brilliant of them, Bishop Bramhall, was not wrong, when affirmed that Hobbes’
philosophy “destroys the very being of God, and leaves nothing in his place, but an empty
name.”179
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Hobbes, 175-210. On the other side are the readings by STRAUSS, Die Religionskritik des Hobbes, Polin,
Hobbes,  Dieu et  les  hommes,  and CURLEY,  “I  Durst  Not  Write  So Boldly,” who believe that Hobbes’
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“Hobbes  and  Theology.  Foreword,” and  ID.  “The  Power  of  Words.  Political  and  Theological
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Introduction, in Hobbes and Bramhall on Liberty and Necessity, ix-xxiii.
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EW, IV, 381. 
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in De Motu, see Paganini, “Introduzione,” in HOBBES, Moto, luogo e tempo, 100-160; and ID., Hobbes’
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ABSTRACTS
Throughout centuries  of  scholarship written on Thomas Hobbes,  the question of  the English
philosopher’s religion has always been one of the most attractive and debated issues. Since the
17th century many of his readers,  such as Bishop John Bramhall,  strongly doubted about his
orthodoxy,  wondering if  Hobbes was not some kind of  hidden atheist.  Even in 20th century,
scholars  of  Hobbes  deeply  debated  this  issue,  but  many  interpreters  often  focused  only  on
theological and theological-political issues in Hobbes’ philosophy, without carefully considering
the relationship  between his  religious  ideas  and Hobbes’  so-called  “philosophia  prima”.  This
article intends to directly address this relationship, firstly, by analysing the different aspects of
religion, examined by Hobbes, such as the anthropological analysis of the religious phenomenon,
and  the  foundations  of  the  dual  “Kingdom  of  God,”  natural,  and  prophetic.  Secondly,  these
elements will be compared with the philosophical foundations of Hobbesian thought, present in
particular in De Motu, Loco et Tempore (or Anti-White) and in De Corpore. This analysis intends to
highlight some fundamental contrasts that make the interpretation of Hobbes’ religious thought
decidedly problematic, and lead us to develop some considerations about the possible presence of
Hobbes in a history of early modern atheism.
Parmi les sujets examinés par l’historiographie hobbesienne, la religion du philosophe anglais a
toujours été l'un des thèmes les plus attractifs et débattus. Cependant, les premiers lecteurs de
Hobbes au XVIIe siècle doutaient déjà fortement de son orthodoxie et certains d'entre eux, tels
l’évêque John Bramhall, le tenaient pour un athée caché. Les spécialistes hobbesiens du XXe siècle
ont  longuement  débattu  de  cette  question,  mais  de  nombreux  chercheurs  se  sont  souvent
concentrés  sur  les  questions  théologiques  et  théologico-politiques  présentes  dans  la  pensée
hobbesienne, sans considérer soigneusement la relation qui subsiste entre les idées religieuses de
Hobbes et la soi-disant « philosophia prima ». Cet article vise à aborder directement cette relation,
d’une  part  en  analysant  les  différents  aspects  de  la  religion  examinés  par  Hobbes,  tels  que
l’analyse anthropologique du phénomène religieux et les fondements du double « Royaume de
Dieu »,  naturel  et  prophétique.  D’autre  part,  ces  éléments  seront  comparés  aux  fondements
philosophiques de la pensée hobbesienne, présentés notamment dans le De Motu, Loco et Tempore
(ou Anti-White) et dans le De Corpore.  Cette analyse a pour but de mettre en évidence certains
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contrastes radicaux qui rendent l'interprétation de la pensée religieuse de Hobbes résolument
problématique,  et  qui  nous  amènent  à  développer  quelques  considérations  sur  la  possibilité
d’une présence de Hobbes dans une histoire de l'athéisme d’époque moderne.
INDEX
Keywords: Hobbes, Bramhall, religion, theology, atheism
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